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Article
FROM SELF-DETERMINATION TO SELFDOMINATION: NATIVE AMERICANS,
WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE PROMISE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL-BASED REFORM
Joshua Fershee*
I. INTRODUCTION
The “Indian Problem” or “Aboriginal Problem” is a deeply ingrained
part of American culture.1 It is worth noting what should be obvious:
“Indian Problem” is itself a loaded phrase. Written from a Canadian
perspective, this reality is aptly explained as follows:
Identifying [the problem] as an Aboriginal problem
inevitably places the onus on Aboriginal people to desist
from “troublesome behaviour.” It is an assimilationist
approach, the kind that has been attempted repeatedly
in the past, seeking to eradicate Aboriginal language,
culture and political institutions from the face of Canada
and to absorb Aboriginal people into the body politic—

Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York, NY. J.D. 2003, Tulane Law School; B.A.
1995, Michigan State University. Editor in Chief, Tulane Law Review, Volume 77 (2002-03).
This Article expresses only my opinions, and I am solely responsible for the contents. This
Article would not have been possible without the encouragement, love, and support of my
wonderful wife, Kendra Jean Huard Fershee, who has shown me anything is possible. I
love you more each and every day. Special thanks also to the editors of the Valparaiso
University Law Review, whose time and effort have made this Article the best it could be.
1
The terms “Indian,” “Native American,” “Aboriginal,” and “Indigenous” are used
throughout this Article and the attempt has been made to use them appropriately.
Recognizing the significant cultural sensitivities related to defining any culture, but
especially in this context, the author apologizes in advance for causing any offense.
*
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so that there are no discernible Aboriginal people and
thus, no Aboriginal problem.2
It appears that the problem is such a part of our culture that we are
as reluctant as we are unable to see it solved. The U.S. government
recognized that there was a problem from the earliest moments of the
country’s founding. The issue continued through the Civil War, where
Native Americans were recognized as requiring specific delineation in
the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Additionally, since 1824,
the United States has had an agency dedicated specifically to dealing
with Native American issues—the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).
Furthermore, Native Americans are owed millions of dollars, but the
money sits, somewhere, doing nothing to promote the welfare of its
rightful owners. Native Americans today continue to be among the
poorest, most unhealthy, and least educated people in the United States.4
They are probably the least respected as well.
Despite repeated pleas for change, Native Americans still see
purported names, symbols, and images of their cultures co-opted for the
profit and exploitation of the white majority.5 Chief Wahoo,6 the
Washington Redskins, and the Jeep Grand Cherokee provide just a few
examples. The American public has seen fit to provide little, if any,
disincentive to cease the exploitation of Native Americans.
By comparison, consider the same issues as they relate to AfricanAmericans. Race issues continue to be a major problem in the United
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES: INTERPRETING THE MANDATE, available at
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/RCAP.htm (last visited July 6, 2004).
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Native Americans are mentioned twice in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The first such mention is a tacit reference: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction therof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Id. § 1 (emphasis added). The second
reference excluded “Indians not taxed” when apportioning representatives. Id. § 2.
4
See, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect
Categories Yield Correct Information?, 15 LAW & INEQ. 83, 86 n.17 (1997) (stating that Native
Americans have three times the unemployment rate of white people, earn less than white
men at all education levels, and have “the highest poverty rate for individuals and families
of any group, and their child poverty rate is second only to that of African-Americans”);
Scott R. Rosner, Legal Approaches to the Use of Native American Logos and Symbols in Sports, 1
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 258, 261 (2002) (“Pervasive problems in the Native American
community include poverty, education, housing, and health care, as well as numerous
other related social ills.”).
5
See Ward Churchill, Let’s Spread the “Fun” Around, in WARD CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE
US?: CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 65-66 (Ward Churchill ed., 1994).
6
Chief Wahoo is the mascot of the Cleveland Indians baseball team.
2
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States, but significant strides have been made in the past forty years. It is
easy for some to forget that less than four decades ago it was legal to
refuse public accommodations to a person because of his skin color.7
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was legal, and common practice, to
restrict access to restaurants, jobs, and medical care.8 This progress does
not indicate the completion of the task, but merely a step in the right
direction. “Equality” is still far from the norm, but real changes have
been made for minorities in the United States, especially AfricanAmericans. These changes have not just been legal, but also cultural.
As it should be, it is no longer acceptable (and there are
consequences) for a professional sports executive to say publicly that
African-Americans are not Major League managers because they are
inherently unable to do the job.9 Implying that things would have been
better in America had a racist regime taken control of the White House
cost a U.S. Senator his job as Senate Majority Leader.10 And “putting on
blackface,” once a common practice for actors and comedians,11 is almost
completely taboo, even, apparently, with the blessing of an AfricanAmerican.12 But when Native Americans request a change,13 there is
7
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding the
constitutionality of the public accommodations provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
8
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447 (2000) (describing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a “momentous event” in the history of federal antidiscrimination
law).
9
See Diane Pucin, Umpire Should Get the Thumb, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, pt. 4, at 1,
available at 2003 WL 2383022 (recounting that “[w]hen former Dodger general manager Al
Campanis said on national television in 1987 that blacks lacked ‘the necessities’ to be
baseball managers and executives, he almost immediately lost his job” despite the fact that,
“he was largely responsible for finding and signing minority players . . . and had, by all
accounts, treated men and women of all races fairly”).
10
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Lott, Uneasy Role as One of 100 in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2003, at A1 (reporting that Senator Lott lost his job as Senate Majority leader over the
controversy from his “comments that the nation would have been better off had Mr.
[Strom] Thurmond, who ran for president in 1948 as a segregationist, been elected”).
11
See David Nicholson, Getting Beneath Blackface, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1998, at D2,
available at 1998 WL 2473540.
12
See Kenneth Turan, “Get Bruce”: Story Behind the Fine Lines, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 17,
1999, at B7, available at 1999 WL 8190710 (stating that Whoopi Goldberg requested that
Bruce Vilanch write then-boyfriend Ted Danson’s now infamous blackface appearance at
the Friar’s Club).
13
See Jeff Dolley, The Four R’s: Use of Indian Mascots in Educational Facilities, 32 J.L. &
EDUC. 21, 21-23 (2003). Dolley states:
Native Americans and others have sought to terminate the use of
Indian mascots in a number of ways. They have sought remedies
against Indian-mascoted schools and sports teams in courts of law;
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little public outcry. Chief Wahoo is probably the most racist caricature
still used as a major promotional image. The functional equivalent to
“Sambo” for African-Americans, the image is still often claimed
somehow to honor Indians.14 The Washington Redskins continue to be
called the Redskins, though it is painfully obvious how absurd and
offensive a similar team called the “Darkies” or the “Blackskins” would
be.15 The most distressing part of all of this is that many people seem to
understand that these things are offensive, yet their use continues.16
In seeking to address the legal and cultural issues facing Native
Americans, there are several sources from which to draw potential
solutions. There is much to be learned from the experiences of other
countries that have dealt with, and are dealing with, similar issues. This
Article will consider three separate experiences and attempt to
synthesize their teachings for application in the United States. The
second Part of the Article will provide a synopsis of the problems and
issues facing Native Americans.17 Part III of this Article will consider
Canada, which has already made some reforms and policy shifts with
respect to indigenous peoples.18 This Part will provide an overview of
the recommendations of Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal
People.19 More specifically, it will review six “conditions for successful
constitutional reform” and will argue that these conditions apply equally
to any similar U.S. initiative.20 Part IV of the Article will look to
Scotland, which recently made reforms to deal with historical
multiethnic governance problems.21 Though not specifically dealing
they have demonstrated against the use of such mascots; and they
have petitioned teams to stop misappropriating their names through
inaccurate logos and mascot décor and behavior.
Id. at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
14
See Churchill, supra note 5, at 66-68 (stating that to “honor” African-Americans in the
same way Native Americans have been honored, a baseball team called the “Sambos”
should be created).
15
See id. at 67-68.
16
It would be hard not to know that Native Americans find them offensive. There have
been several demonstrations and requests for change, such as the clash between protesters
and supporters at a November 15, 1992, football game between the Washington Redskins
and the Kansas City Chiefs. Id. at 66. Furthermore, several athletics teams, primarily in the
college ranks, have changed their names. For instance, the St. John’s College sports teams
were the “Redmen” and are now the “Red Storm,” and the Miami University of Ohio
“Redskins” are now the “RedHawks.”
17
See infra Part II.
18
See infra Part III.
19
See infra Part III.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part IV.
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with indigenous peoples, the Scottish experience provides some
interesting options for consideration. Australia will be the focus of
Part V; Australia has been considering a redrafting of its constitution for
some time.22 One of the major issues, though, has been how to address
the rights of and obligations to the aboriginal tribes. Finally, Part VI will
attempt to combine that which has been learned from past U.S. policies
with the experiences of Canada, Scotland, and Australia to propose a
change in the legal landscape as it applies to Native Americans.23 Such a
change will require a change in the collective legislative and judicial
mindset. To have even a chance to resolve some of the current issues
facing Native Americans, proposed solutions should be based on a
concept of self-domination, instead of self-determination.
Selfdomination is a concept designed to override and move beyond the SelfDetermination Era, an era that has failed in its most fundamental, if wellmeaning, goals.
II. THE INDIAN PROBLEM
We did not ask you white men to come here. The Great Spirit
gave us this country as a home. You had yours. We did not
interfere with you. The Great Spirit gave us plenty of land to
live on, and buffalo, deer, antelope and other game. But you
have come here; you are taking my land from me; you are
killing off our game, so it is hard for us to live.24
-Crazy Horse (Lakota)
Since the earliest days of the white man’s arrival in North America,
the native peoples have been struggling to retain what is rightfully
theirs. Whether it is their land, their resources, or their culture, Native
Americans have had to fight for just about everything.
A. Native American Legal History: Whose Version?
Native American legal history is often divided into “eras,” which
underscore the government’s Indian policy of the time. The primary
eras are the Removal Era, the Reservation Era, the Allotment and
Assimilation Era, the Reorganization Era, the Termination Era, and the

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
24
PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE (Penguin Books 1992) (1983)
(quoting Crazy Horse).
22
23
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Self-Determination Era.25 Traditional scholars of Indian Law often
analyze these eras as “good” or “bad” periods when describing the
evolution of Native American legal rights.26 Professor Robert A.
Williams, Jr., argues that this view of Native American legal history is
lacking because “there are never any Indians in the story of Indian rights
[that] traditional scholars tell.”27 Professor Williams calls this “the White
Man’s Indian Law,” which he says is problematic because it teaches that
Indian struggles that ultimately led to United States Supreme Court
decisions or congressional legislation were fought only by non-Indians.28
He is undoubtedly correct when looking at the historical implications of
how Indian Law has evolved. However, the traditional scholarly view of
Indian Law still provides a helpful starting point from which to analyze
the issues facing Native Americans today because the problem was
largely created by the white majority and, at least to some degree, must
be solved within the framework still controlled by the same.
From the early Supreme Court cases that defined Native American
rights, the Cherokee Cases, Indians have been treated as wards of the state,
with the U.S. government serving as the “guardians.”29 Chief Justice
John Marshall also established early on that Congress, through the
Constitution, has plenary power to regulate Indian affairs.30 This
plenary power, apparently granted through the Indian Commerce
Clause,31 provides Congress the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes.”32 It is this lurking power, regardless of what policy
towards Native Americans is in vogue, that necessitates the development
of solutions from within the framework of the traditional system and
possibly changes to the Constitution itself.

See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at xv (4th ed. 1998).
See Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are found Are Often Their
Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 981, 983-84 (1996).
27
Id. at 984 (recounting the comments of Vine Deloria, Jr.).
28
Id. at 985.
29
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Williams, supra note 26, at
981 (“[N]o theme recurs with more urgency or consistency in the history of Federal Indian
Law than the federal government’s legal duty to protect Indians from the white racial
power and hostility organized by states in our federal system of government.”).
30
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
31
See id.
32
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25
26
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The problems of this lurking power can be seen in eras such as the
Allotment and Assimilation Era.33 By passing the Allotment Act of
1887,34 Congress created a way to provide white people easier access to
Indian lands, particularly in the western states.35 The Act provided that
the President of the United States could, “[i]n all cases where any tribe or
band of Indians has been or shall be located upon any reservation,”
order the land “to be surveyed or resurveyed whenever in his opinion
such reservation or any part may be advantageously utilized for
agricultural or grazing purposes by such Indians” and allotted to “each
Indian located thereon . . . for [his] best interest.”36 This allotment,
placing ownership of the reservation in the hands of individuals instead
of the group, paved the way for white people to take over large parcels
of Indian-held land.37 Furthermore, it created “surplus lands” that
remained after allotment.38 These surplus lands were naturally made
available to white settlers.39 Congress was thus able to override, or at a
minimum modify, reservations created by treaty, law, or executive order,
without any regard for the opinions of those affected the most.40
Other eras have seen equally appalling results. For instance, in the
Removal Era, the President was granted the power to move Native
Americans to lands west of the Mississippi River.41 In 1836, against their
will, thousands of Creek Indians were moved from Alabama to
Oklahoma and left with virtually nothing.42 In the Termination Era,
governmental policy moved toward total integration of Native
Americans.43 This era saw the termination of 109 tribes and bands.44

33
See GETCHES, supra note 25, at 141 (listing the Allotment & Assimilation Era as running
from 1871-1928).
34
Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)) (repealed 2000).
35
See Williams, supra note 26, at 984.
36
25 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
37
See Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27
N.M. L. REV. 273, 282 n.46 (1997) (stating that there was widespread sentiment “that
individual ownership of property was a prerequisite to the . . . civilizing [of] the Indians”).
38
See Adrian N. Hansen, Note, The Endangered Species Act and the Extinction of Reserved
Indian Water Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1317 n.91 (1995) (“The
Dawes Act termed lands not allotted to individual Indians as ‘surplus’ and therefore open
for homesteading and purchase.”).
39
Williams, supra note 26, at 984.
40
See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
41
See Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, 411.
42
ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 103 (1970).
43
See GETCHES, supra note 25, at 204.
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These examples provide just a minuscule snapshot of the U.S.
government’s well-chronicled maltreatment of Native Americans.45
B. The Self-Determination Era: History Repeats Itself
The current era, Self-Determination, has been in place since 1961.46
The concept behind self-determination has been described as comprising
a collection of norms that “include rights to cultural integrity, use of
lands and natural resources, social welfare and development, selfgovernment, and freedom from discrimination.”47 While this era is more
“pro-Indian” than others, especially the Termination or Relocation Eras,
case law and government practices indicate limited movement toward
any true policy of self-determination. In fact, “[t]he Supreme Court has
become more hostile to Native American interests in its resolution of
issues of tribal self-determination, highlighting the dearth of secure
footholds in judicial doctrine for Native American law.”48 The current
judicial doctrines that courts apply in cases where tribal sovereignty is at
issue do not take the Native American perspective into account.49
Indicative of policy failures in this area is the current state of affairs
related to the individual Indian money trust accounts (“IIM trust” or
“trust”). The U.S. government, through the BIA, owes Native Americans
millions of dollars that it is holding as the guardian of the trust.50 The
trust has been managed so poorly that millions of dollars are missing.51
44
See Kevin J. Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal
Thought on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1381 n.40 (1991) (reviewing
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT).
45
See, e.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 5; JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (University
of Nebraska Press 1995) (1932).
46
See GETCHES, supra note 25, at xv.
47
Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1751, 1757-58 (2003).
48
Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage,
112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922 (1999); cf. Note, supra note 47 (“Although the political branches
have recently adopted policies that favor Indian tribal self-determination, the judicial
doctrines defining the extent of inherent tribal sovereignty and the federal government’s
power over tribes remain severe obstacles for tribes seeking to govern themselves and
maintain their cultural integrity.”) (footnotes omitted).
49
See id. (citing, inter alia, Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS.
L. REV. 219, 258-89).
50
See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that there are as
many as three hundred thousand individual IIM accounts totaling as much as four
hundred fifty million dollars).
51
Douglas R. Nash & Christopher P. Graham, Cobell v. Norton—Indian Trust Fund
Management Litigation Takes Center Stage, ADVOCATE, Mar. 2003, at 15 (stating that the IIM
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To force a better accounting, a number of Native Americans filed class
action lawsuits against the United States.52 The failures of the U.S.
government have been shown throughout these cases. The government
has proven completely ineffective even under the watch of the courts.
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt was even held in contempt for his
role in the continued inadequacy.53 These repeated failures make clear
the need for a new plan and a new way of thinking if Native Americans
are to have the tools to reverse the centuries-long cycle of poverty and
despair.
III. NORTH OF THE BORDER: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
In 1992, the Canadian government set forth the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples (“Commission”) to analyze and explore options
regarding constitutional reform proposals “as they related to Aboriginal
self-government.”54 The goals of the Commission were to avoid an
impasse in the process and to provide a basis for common understanding
of the issues involved in any constitutional reforms.55 While the
Canadian Constitution in 1992 already had some provisions that make
the debate different from that in the United States,56 there are significant
trust law suits were initiated “on behalf of all present and past individual trust
beneficiaries against the United States for failure to properly manage trust assets”).
52
See, e.g., Cobell, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
53
Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 39 (D.D.C. 1999). During the contempt trial, it
became clear that 162 boxes of relevant documents had been destroyed by the Treasury
Department. Nash & Graham, supra note 51. The Departments of Interior and Treasury
had to pay six hundred thousand dollars in penalties. Id. The Treasury Department
continued its inadequacy, reporting in 2000 that more Indian trust documents had been
destroyed. Id.
54
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, THE RIGHT OF ABORIGINAL SELFGOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY preface (1992), available at
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/docs/Aboriginal_Self-Government.doc (last visited July 6, 2004).
In the terms of reference, the Commission’s mandate described:
The Commission of Inquiry should investigate the evolution of the
relationship among aboriginal peoples (Indian, Inuit and Metis), the
Canadian government, and Canadian society as a whole. It should
propose specific solutions, rooted in domestic and international
experience, to the problems which have plagued those relationships
and which confront aboriginal peoples today. The Commission should
examine all issues which it deems to be relevant to any or all of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada, and in particular, should investigate and
make concrete recommendations . . . .
Id. at app., Sched. I.
55
Id. at Introduction.
56
See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) §§ 25, 35, 37; ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 1.
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overlaps between Canadian and American experiences with native
peoples. The Commission promoted six “conditions for successful
constitutional reform” that provide a solid foundation upon which to
build.57
First, the Commission stated, “it is essential that the right of selfgovernment be explicitly identified in the Constitution as inherent in
nature.”58 This principle is at the core of Aboriginal rights, and it is
necessary to identify the source and the nature of those rights. The
Commission recognized the competing view that “Aboriginal people
have no rights of government except those that the Federal and
Provincial governments are prepared to bestow upon them.”59 This view
is consistent with many U.S. cases, which followed the traditional
discovery doctrine view that all rights flow from the government
(originally the King).60 Yet the Commission determined that the
preferable view was that indigenous peoples are the “heirs to ancient
and enduring powers of government that they brought with them into
the Confederation and still retain today.”61
In particular, the Commission believed that the identification of the
right to self-government as inherent would provide significant benefits
as applied by the courts. The Commission argued that there were
“important practical implications” found in the term “inherent”: “By
clearly identifying the source and nature of the right, it gives courts and
other interested parties a strong mandate to implement the right and
significant guidance how to interpret it.”62 This identification of rights
would limit the role of governmental intent in interpretation and instead
return the focus to the traditional and contemporary views of the native
peoples themselves.63 The added benefit, recognizing the great diversity
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C.
Id.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 573 (1823) (“This principle was,
that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.”). But see Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal
Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 325 (1993) (arguing that plenary power and the United States’
“absolute property rights” over Native American lands are religiously based concepts).
61
See ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt.
2.C. Under this view, inherent rights are recognized in written documents like treaties and
constitutions, but the source of the rights is the Aboriginal nation itself. Id.
62
Id.
63
See id.
57
58

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/1

Fershee: From Self-Determination to Self-Domination: Native Americans, We

2004]

Self-Determination to Self-Domination

11

among native peoples, is that “the right may well assume different
shapes in the various Aboriginal nations.”64 Such a benefit should not be
overlooked. Indigenous peoples have been treated consistently as
though their worldviews and histories are one and the same; this could
not be further from the truth.65 Providing a mechanism for courts and
other entities to apply nation-specific rights would be a tremendous step
forward in the treatment of indigenous peoples.66
Next, the Commission advocated the recognition of the scope of the
inherent right as “circumscribed rather than uncircumscribed.”67 This
recognition would allow Aboriginal governments to coexist under the
Constitution with the federal and local governments, all of which hold
limited powers as defined by the Constitution.68 Otherwise, the
Commission recognized, Aboriginal governments would hold unlimited
powers in all areas, including international relations and defense.69
While failing to provide complete autonomy, describing the inherent
rights as circumscribed provides a political and practical solution to the
reality of the situation.
Third, the Commission advocated clear, though limited, sovereignty,
allowing certain Aboriginal laws to take precedent over the laws of other
governmental entities.70 In some situations, Aboriginal laws would hold
exclusive province; in other areas, federal or provincial laws would share
overlapping jurisdiction.71 This is not a new concept for Canadians or
Americans because of their federal systems of government.72
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Commission stated that
any constitutional reform related to Aboriginal peoples must have “the
full involvement and consent of the Aboriginal peoples.”73 The
Id.
See Ward Churchill, Naming our Destiny, in CHURCHILL, supra note 5, at 291, 299-306
(describing Indian nations as having distinct and separate identities).
66
In the United States, of course, there would likely be an Equal Protection Clause
limitation on those “different rights” that could be recognized.
67
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. This is a laudable goal, though perhaps a bit unrealistic. Getting consensus from
any group of people is rare, and, as recognized earlier, the diverse set of beliefs and goals
of the various native groups would likely make consensus impossible. Nonetheless, the
underlying motivation behind this recommendation is right on point.
64
65
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Commission recognized “many regrettable instances” relating to
changes in the rights and powers of Aboriginal peoples that proceeded
without their consent or participation and often directly contrary to their
expressed desires.74 “This high-handed, unilateral approach is out of
keeping with the basic constitutional relationship between Aboriginal
nations and the Crown and departs from the consensual approach
reflected, however imperfectly, in the numerous treaties concluded
between Aboriginal nations and the Crown.”75
Fifth, the Commission advocated that any explicit recognition of the
inherent right of self-government should not diminish any already
existing rights.76 That is, any such new constitutional provision “should
serve to enhance the rights already recognized.”77 The Canadian
Supreme Court has supported a view of an Aboriginal right of selfgovernment,78 and section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 may already
recognize and affirm such a right.79 The Commission thus recommended
that any new initiative clearly support, and not undermine, this
interpretation.80
Lastly, the Commission stated that any new provision must be
“justiciable as soon as it is passed, without a ‘transition period.’”81 This
requirement necessarily follows from any constitutional recognition of
an inherent right of self-government.82 Any “inherent” right should be
available immediately.83 Furthermore, any delay in justiciability may
provide less than what is already provided by section 35 of the Canada
Constitution.84 Any delay would imply that such a right did not already

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 25; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C.
80
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. (“If the right of self-government is identified in the Constitution as inherent in its
nature and origins, it is hard to see how its recognition in the courts can be delayed.”).
84
See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 35; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C.
74
75
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exist, thus conflicting with criterion five of the Commission’s conditions
for successful reform.85
The Commission’s criteria provide a powerful starting point for any
consideration of constitutional reform, especially in the United States.
The recommendations are even more applicable because Canada’s
federal system provides several similarities to the U.S. federal system as
it relates to native peoples.
In Canada, the Commission’s
recommendations have led to continued discourse on the issue but have
not led to any changes to Canada’s constitution. The Commission
appears to represent a more dedicated governmental response to the
issue and has provided clear, forward-looking recommendations,86
though to date they have led to little progress. However, the
recommendations still provide a good place to start.87
IV. FEDERALISM & DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH SOLUTION
A new kind of federalism is now in place in Great Britain, a
significant portion of which involves Scottish devolution and the
creation of a new Scottish Parliament.88 This new federalism, which
Professor Colin Picker calls “graduated federalism,”89 provides an
intriguing possibility for determining how to provide increased
sovereignty for Native Americans, while working within the federal
system created through the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, this Scottish
solution provides an interesting perspective because of Britain’s lack of a
written constitution,90 thus making such devolution an even more
creative and unique approach.91

See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C (stating that “[t]his criterion
follows directly from points already made”).
86
See ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.D
(providing four options designed to clear some of “the obstacles to fruitful constitutional
negotiations . . . [and] to smooth the path to further exchanges between the parties, not to
usurp their rightful place at the negotiating table”).
87
See id.
88
Colin B. Picker, “A Light unto the Nations”—The New British Federalism, the Scottish
Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for Multiethnic States, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
89
Id. (stating that while Britain does not have any single document that acts as its
constitution, there is still, in some sense, a constitution).
90
Id.
91
VERNON BOGANDOR, DEVOLUTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (Christopher Butler et al.
eds., 1999) (calling Scottish devolution the “most radical constitutional change” in Great
Britain since 1832).
85
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Beyond this, as a federal system, Britain, like Canada, offers
structural parallels that can assist in the development of a plan for the
United States. One of the primary purposes of federalism is to balance
the interests of majority and minority populations.92 Clearly, this goal
has not always led to the protection of minority rights in the United
States.93 But over time it has provided a framework within which to
work. Though certainly not a panacea, the potential benefits of
federalism apply to Native Americans as much as they apply to the
Scottish or, for that matter, to African-Americans. As Professor Picker
explains:
The idea of balancing [majority and minority interests],
as opposed to fully resolving, the desires of people
through devices of federalism may be better thought of
as “conflict management” as opposed to “conflict
resolution.”
Though it should be noted that the
“management” may serve only to postpone the
inevitable escalation of the conflict, and may sometimes
exacerbate the problem by encouraging other groups to
agitate and, or in the alternative, seek separation.
Federalism, as conflict management, has been used to
deal with such conflict issues as, among others, religion,
language, race, and culture. By allowing greater local
control, these disparate interests can be accommodated,
yet still maintain the state, even while encouraging or
allowing diversity.94
For these reasons, the new Scottish system offers some useful
options that should be considered when looking for solutions in the
United States.
Scottish devolution returned “Scottish representative democracy in
part to where it stood almost three hundred years ago.”95 The British
Picker, supra note 88, at 73.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing the embodiment of the three-fifths
compromise, which apportioned representatives and direct taxes based on the “whole
Number of free Persons . . . [and] three-fifths of all other Persons [e.g., slaves]”); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (establishing the “separate-but-equal rule”), overruled
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1959); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 17 (2000)
(stating that although slavery was “clearly incompatible with the principles of the
American Revolution,” slavery was removed from the agenda at the Constitutional
Convention because it “threatened to disrupt the fragile union just as it was congealing”).
94
Picker, supra note 88, at 73-74 (footnotes omitted).
95
Id. at 33.
92
93
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Parliament still holds significant powers, but the new Scottish
Parliament “harkens back” three hundred years “in spirit if not in
effect.”96 This attempt to restore some form of self-control is what makes
it such an intriguing example when considered as an option for Native
Americans. It is unquestionable that three hundred years ago Scotland
was a sovereign in the Anglo-Saxon tradition; Native Americans of the
same time had drastically different forms of government. To some
people this might indicate that the Scottish experience is inapposite in its
application to Native Americans. But what the system provides—a way
of returning a level of sovereignty to an underrepresented people—is
exactly what is needed for Native Americans in the United States.
In 1997, after Tony Blair was elected British Prime Minister,
devolution became an alternative for the Scots as an option via two
referenda.97 The referenda garnered strong support among the Scottish
people.98 This support led to the British Parliament’s passage of the
Scotland Act of 1998 (“Scotland Act”), which created the Scottish
Parliament.99
One of the more significant powers the new Scottish Parliament
enjoys is the power to tax.100 This taxing power provides a significant
“measure of freedom for the Scottish Parliament” and was viewed as a
critical part of the early devolution process.101 The revenue-generating
power, while providing an additional freedom, also required that the
Scottish voters agree to pay for some of their newly found freedom.102
This is not to imply that Scotland is, in any way, a wholly-independent
entity; there are significant restrictions on the powers of the Scottish
Parliament. For instance, the taxing power is limited to tax increases or
decreases of three percent.103 This may lead to significant restrictions,
and “it remains to be seen what will be the real financial impact on the

Id.
Id. at 42. Two referenda were presented to the Scottish electorate. Id. at 43. The first
asked whether the people wanted a separate parliament; the second whether that
parliament should have the power to tax. Id. at 43-44. Both referenda passed with more
than sixty percent of the vote. See id. at 42 n.253.
98
Id.
99
Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 1 (Eng.) (“There shall be a Scottish Parliament.”).
100
Id. § 73.
101
Picker, supra note 88, at 43.
102
See id. at 44 (“[T]his was a case of asking the electorate whether they desired to pay
more for real devolution, a perceived question of payment not normally put to the
electorate (of course the vote was on the power to tax, not an actual tax increase itself).”).
103
Scotland Act § 73.
96
97
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Scottish Parliament’s ability to carry out its policies free from the
budgetary constraints” of the British Parliament.104
In addition, the Scottish Parliament lacks complete legislative
sovereignty.105 The Scottish Parliament is an inferior legislative body to
the British Parliament in Westminster.106 Though not directly analogous,
this relationship is similar to that of the relationship between the U.S.
government and the states.107 Interestingly, the limitation on the
legislative competency of the Scottish Parliament is limited only to those
areas specifically reserved to the British Parliament.108 Thus the Scottish
Parliament retains residual powers; the “powers not reserved to
Westminster are devolved to Scotland.”109
When devolution was proposed, executive powers, along with
legislative powers, were thought to be among the powers that needed to
be devolved.110 The Scotland Act provided for a similar Scottish
Executive to that of the British Parliament.111 The Scottish Executive is
comprised of a Scottish First Minister, along with other ministers, all of
whom are Members of Scottish Parliament (“MSPs”).112 The executive
power is, in many ways, less independent than the legislative power, at
least to the extent that many decisions, including who will ultimately
lead the Executive, is not left in Scotland.113 For instance, the Queen
appoints the First Minister from among the MSPs.114 Furthermore, the
two leading judicial positions, Lord Advocate and Solicitor General, are
See Picker, supra note 88, at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
106
Scotland Act § 28; see also Picker, supra note 88, at 45.
107
Picker, supra note 88, at 45 (comparing Scotland Act § 28 to the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution).
108
See Scotland Act sched. 5.
109
Picker, supra note 88, at 45-46. The freedoms devolved to the Scottish Parliament
provide an interesting contrast to the relationship between the U.S. government and the
states. Compare Scotland Act sched. 5 (specifically detailing areas exclusively reserved for
the British Parliament), with U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”). Yet, in some cases, the powers reserved by
Westminster are similar to the those powers reserved “under the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution and under the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government.” Picker, supra note 88, at 47 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
110
Picker, supra note 88, at 49.
111
Id. at 48-49.
112
Scotland Act §§ 44-51; Picker, supra note 88, at 48.
113
See Scotland Act §§ 44-51.
114
Scotland Act §§ 45-46; see also Picker, supra note 88, at 49 (noting that the Queen
appoints a First Minister “upon the nomination of the Parliament following a vote of the
MSPs after an election or resignation or other vacancy”).
104
105
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appointed by the Queen and, unlike the other members of the Scottish
Executive, cannot be removed by the First Minister.115 “Only the Queen,
and hence Westminster, may terminate their positions.”116
Despite some clear limitations on sovereignty, in just a few years the
Scottish Parliament has passed more than thirty laws, indicating that
“Scottish representative democracy is alive and well and able to focus on
‘Scottish solutions for Scotland.’“117 It remains to be seen whether the
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive will be willing to lead
independently on difficult issues, thus exposing themselves to inevitable
backlash.118 But all early indications point to a willingness to embrace
the newly devolved power for the benefit of the Scottish people.119
V. REWRITING HISTORY: THE PROBLEMS OF A NEW AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION
Australia’s history with its Aboriginal predecessors parallels that of
the United States in many ways. For instance, Australia has gone
through policy periods that roughly mirror those of the U.S.
government.120 In the colonial period, the Australian government
followed a policy of eradication, which included “waterhole poisonings,
shootings, massacres and other savagery.”121 The next era, well into the
nineteenth century, involved a policy of protection.122 This era was
influenced, in part, by a need for an inexpensive and available
workforce.123
Beginning around 1937, the Australian government adopted an
assimilation policy, followed by an integration policy in the early
1960s.124 Furthermore, the ability to vote in federal elections was not
granted to the Aborigines until 1962; it was not until 1965 that all six
Australian states granted franchise rights to all citizens, regardless of
race.125 Finally, a policy of multiculturalism was adopted, politically and
Scotland Act § 48; Picker, supra note 88, at 50.
Picker, supra note 88, at 50.
117
Id. at 52-53.
118
Id. at 52.
119
Id.
120
Rick Sarre, Critical Perspectives of Native People: The Imprisonment of Indigenous
Australians: Dilemmas and Challenges for Policymakers, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 165, 167 (1999).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
115
116
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legally, in the last fifteen years.126 The goals of this policy are selfdetermination and self-management,127 similar to the stated goals of
current U.S. policy.
Yet the purported governmental policy does not appear to be the
policy of the majority of Australians. A referendum held to determine
whether to recognize officially the status of the Aborigines as Australia’s
“first people” was soundly defeated in 1999.128 The proposal, which
garnered only forty percent of the vote, included adding a new preamble
to Australia’s constitution.129 Interestingly, there is some sentiment that
the Aborigines were not particularly fond of the preamble as
presented.130 This sentiment is understandable. In a press release, Prime
Minister John Howard stated: “The legislation will contain a clause
declaring that the preamble has no legal force or effect and cannot be
invoked in the interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution.”131

126
See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act (1989) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aatsica1989478/ (last visited July 6,
2004).
127
See Sarre, supra note 120, at 168.
128
Australia Rejects Republic, BBC NEWS (London), Nov. 6, 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/507293.stm (last visited July 6, 2004).
129
Id. The proposed preamble read as follows:
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of Australia is constituted as a
democracy with a federal system of Government to serve the common
good. We the Australian people commit ourselves to this Constitution.
Proud that our national unity has been forged by Australians from
many ancestries; never forgetting the sacrifices of all who defended
our country and our liberty in time of war; upholding freedom,
tolerance, individual dignity, and the rule of law; honouring
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation’s first people, for
their deep kinship with their lands and for their ancient and
continuing cultures which enrich the life of our country; recognising
the national building contribution of generations of immigrants;
mindful of our responsibility to protect our unique natural
environment; supportive of achievement as well as equality of
opportunity for all; and valuing independence as dearly as the national
spirit which binds us together in both adversity and success.
Id.
130
No Official Recognition for Aborigines, BBC NEWS (London), Nov. 6, 1999, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/507377.stm (last visited July 6, 2004).
Kim Beazley, the Labor opposition leader stated the following: “None of the indigenous
people it seemed to me particularly wanted the way in which they were referred to in the
constitution. So I doubt whether they’ll be feeling a deep sense of loss tonight.” Id.
131
Press Release, John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, Preamble to the
Constitution (Mar. 23, 1999), available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/
1999/preamble.htm (last visited July 6, 2004).
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Apparently, despite indications to the contrary, there was some fear that
the courts would use the preamble.132
This referendum also included a vote on a separate issue: Whether
Australia would “break ties with the British monarchy and become a
republic.”133 This kind of controversy is hard to imagine in the United
States, given that U.S. independence began with a sudden break from
British control.134 The concept of any British control, however small, is
unthinkable to most Americans.135 It appears, though, that having a
British Head of State is less offensive to the Australian people than
allowing their parliament to choose their leader; the majority, it seems,
prefers a direct election or no change at all.136
On the other hand, the Australian constitutional amendment process
is very similar to that of the United States in the sense that it is extremely
difficult to change.137 The process requires a nationwide majority vote,
along with a majority in four out of six states.138 Only eight of the fortyfour referenda have succeeded, none of which were on contentious
issues.139 The defeat of the preamble was a lost opportunity “to define
the nation as it recognised the contribution of immigrants, the sacrifices
of soldiers, and the historical role of Aborigines in creating a free and
See ARTHUR TUCK, Republic or Constitutional Monarchy?, at http://www.angelfire.com/
id/ronajoyner/tuckvote.html#Offer (last visited July 6, 2004) (stating that, according to Sir
Harry Gibbs, a retired Chief Justice of the High Court, the preamble would be used by the
High Court and the United Nations “to undermine or destroy our system of land title in
unforseen ways”).
133
Australia Rejects Republic, supra note 128. This proposal was defeated 54.22% to
44.87%. Id. The proposal stated:
Do you agree with “A proposed law to alter the constitution to
establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a Republic with the
Queen and Governor General being replaced by a President appointed
by a two-thirds majority of members of the Commonwealth
Parliament?”
Id.
134
See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 93, at 5 (“The creation of a separate American nation occurred
suddenly rather than gradually, in revolutionary rather than evolutionary fashion . . . .”).
135
See Seth Mydans, Sydney Journal; and Elizabeth Windsor Is Still the Strong Favorite, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A4 (“Now neither Britain nor the United States would think of
having an Australian as head of state.”) (quoting Gerard Henderson, executive director the
Sydney Institute).
136
See id. (reporting that a minority of the Australian population are “monarchists,” but
that the vote failed because a large majority wanted to elect the Head of State directly, not
via Parliament).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
132
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tolerant democracy.”140 A similar opportunity is lost every day that the
United States fails to recognize formally the wrongs perpetrated on
Native Americans in the past and fails to act to improve the current
treatment of Native Americans. It is this lesson that we should take from
the Australian experience.
If not, the consequences could be
significant.141
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Need for a New Era
In order to move forward, the time is right for a new approach to
Native American policy, using new, if largely symbolic, language that
embodies this policy shift and the dawn of a new era. The new era
would be called Self-Domination to highlight the need for Native
Americans to control their future. Domination, defined as the “exercise
of preponderant, governing, or controlling influence,”142 is more
appropriate than “determination” in describing what should be the
policy goals of the courts and legislatures. In many ways, any “new era”
would be a largely semantic change, at least short of any new legislation
or constitutional amendment. But often a change in language can be a
precursor to new legislation and judicial doctrines that will lead to real
change for those affected. At this point, it may be that a change in
language is the first realistic step in the process of improving the
autonomy of Native Americans.
Furthermore, a new era is necessary because of the gross
ineffectiveness of the Self-Determination Era. This ineffectiveness,
coupled with neglect and mismanagement by the government, is largely
tied to a lack of sufficient Native American control over Native

See K.P. Waran, Link to the Monarchy at Stake, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Nov. 6,
1999, at 10 (providing the statements of Aden Ridgeway, Australia’s only Aboriginal
politician). But see id. (“Opponents of the preamble include several Aboriginal leaders who
have called for stronger terms than ‘deep kinship’ to recognise Aboriginal ownership of the
land.”).
141
Cf. Kathy Marks, Aboriginal Protests May Turn Violent, Says Leader, INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 8, 2000, at 14 (“In protest situations you are always going to have a volatile
situation which may have the capacity to go out of control.”) (quoting Geoff Clark,
chairman of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Australia’s biggest
indigenous body). In no way is this meant to imply that a Native American riot is around
the corner. It is merely a recognition that the longer people live under the control of an
unsympathetic government, the more likely violent confrontation is to occur.
142
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 344 (10th ed. 1996).
140
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American affairs.143 Current policy gives Native Americans insufficient
control, effectively limiting their ability to find lasting solutions.
B. Judicial Doctrine
Next, current judicial doctrine can promote a judicial change in
attitude toward Native Americans. This change in attitude should lead
the courts to revisit some of the definitions and descriptions from cases
in which decisions were made on highly biased and dubious grounds.
For instance, Congress’s plenary power has been reduced somewhat
over time144 through the courts’ application of the trust doctrine.145 At
times, the trust doctrine has led to interpretations of treaties and statutes
in ways favorable to Native Americans.146 “However, the modern Court
relies less on the canons [of construction] and sometimes interprets old
statutes and treaties according to perceptions of contemporaneous (and
racist) government officials.”147 Furthermore, interpretations of old
treaties and statutes using “contemporaneous views” invariably mean
the views of the white-male majority of the time period, not of all the
parties involved.148 For Native Americans, treaties were sacred, fulfilling
“a divine command for all the peoples of the world to unite as one.”149
For the “Indians of the Classical Era,” treaties were often about life and
death, and they regarded treaties as such. The goals of these Native
Americans included the following: ensuring a “lasting peace after the
shedding of blood, quelling the desire for revenge, being assured that a
military ally would respond quickly to a call for help,” and finding
trustworthy trading partners.150 If courts are going to use the views of
the original era to interpret old treaties, the entire picture must be
considered. Treaties are inherently two party documents; to look only at
the judges or the generals or the Congress of the time leaves half of the
story untold. Native Americans deserve the benefit of their bargain.

See supra Part II.B.
See Note, supra note 47, at 1753.
145
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (providing an early
example of the trust doctrine).
146
See Note, supra note 47, at 1753-54 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556, 570-72 (1883)).
147
Id. at 1754.
148
See Williams, supra note 26, at 991.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 992.
143
144
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Additionally, international law doctrine should be considered when
courts interpret laws or statutes pertaining to Native Americans. The
“international standard-setting process,” through which states draft
international treaties and human rights agreements, can assist in
determining congressional intent.151 For example, the U.S. government
has participated in the process, worked with tribes in creating various
documents, and expressed a commitment to Native American selfdetermination.152 These should all be considerations when a court
determines the rights of Native Americans.153
C. Current Constitutional Options
Third, the Constitution itself, especially the Indian Commerce Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment, can provide additional motivation to
change judicial and legislative policy toward Native Americans. Though
it is not without controversy, it has been said, “Indian tribes, of course,
constitute a third domestic sovereign entity recognized by, but
predating, the U.S. Constitution.”154 This is probably correct.
For example, from the outset, Justice John Marshall set limits on
tribal sovereignty,155 but recognized Indian tribes as “domestic
dependent nations.”156 For about “150 years, . . . the presumption
remained that tribal sovereignty extended to all preexisting tribal
powers, unless those powers were abrogated by federal treaty or
statute.”157 Despite changes and reductions over the years in tribal
sovereignty, the Supreme Court’s federal Indian law until the late 1970s
still seemed to apply “a presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty.”158
The courts should return to this presumption, returning to Native
Americans some of the limited rights that were available in even lessenlightened times.

See Note, supra note 47, at 1764.
Id.
153
See id.
154
Stephen J. McHugh, The Integration of State Private Law in Federalized Fields of Law: The
Case for Federal Common Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 207, 214 n.32 (1996).
155
Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 288, 290 (2003).
156
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
157
Struve, supra note 155, at 290-91.
158
Id. at 291-92.
151
152
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D. The Amendment Option
Finally, though obviously more academic than practical at this point,
a constitutional amendment could promote Self-Domination and,
hopefully, a more fruitful existence for Native Americans. Such an
amendment could be as simple as drafting language to define specific
rights of Native Americans, thus dictating the approach the courts and
legislature should take in setting policy. This could lead to an
amendment that would be arguably a tautology, much like the Tenth
Amendment.159 However, given the continuing struggles and unique
role of Native Americans in U.S. history, such an amendment would
secure, in a small but significant way, recognition of North America’s
indigenous peoples that has been severely lacking since before the
drafting of the Constitution. Any drafting of such language must
involve Native Americans, as we have learned from the Australian
experience160 and the Canadian Commission’s research.161
Another issue of concern is the issue of sovereignty. It has been long
established, and regularly repeated, that Native American tribes are a
sort of dependent sovereign.162 Native Americans “remain a ‘separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations.’”163 Furthermore, “[t]hey have power to make their own
substantive law in internal matters.”164 As discussed earlier, this is
extremely misleading because Congress, at any time, has power over
virtually all Native American rights.
“Supreme Court case law
repeatedly creates and then recognizes the enormity of the ‘plenary’
federal power over the Indian tribes.”165 The Termination Era represents
a good example of Congress exercising its power. “Termination stands
159
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment
likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology.”); cf. U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
160
See supra Part V.
161
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 696 n.116 (1989); cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
580 (1832) (“At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing in
the Indians, but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes of
sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self government have been recognized as vested
in them.”).
163
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382 (1886)).
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Id.
165
Resnik, supra note 162, at 693.
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as a chilling reminder to Indian peoples that Congress can unilaterally
decide to extinguish the special status and rights of tribes without Indian
consent and without even hearing Indian views.”166
To have any sovereignty, some sovereignty must be guaranteed.
The states, for instance, are often considered sovereigns of sorts, but
under the Constitution, they are clearly subordinate to the federal
government.167 Despite this subordinate relationship, the states do have
some, albeit indirectly, recognized rights in the Constitution. The Tenth
Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”168 While this power is often
recognized as a tautology, nonetheless, the mere existence of the Tenth
Amendment provides for a certain amount of interpretive deference.
Though not recently, the courts have applied the Tenth Amendment “to
prove that states reserved all nondelegated powers.”169 Thus the Tenth
Amendment is, if nothing else, a reminder that federal government
power over the states was not meant to be absolute.
Despite the difficulties in drafting and passing a constitutional
amendment, the effort could be time well spent. For one thing,
generating a real and focused discourse about Native American rights
has value. Such a discourse has the potential to inspire, motivate, and
reenergize a culture that has been long ignored. It would also likely
inflame and open old wounds, but that is part of the healing process. By
taking a close look at what rights should be guaranteed to those that
occupied the land now known as the United States and attempting to
guarantee such rights, the people of the United States would be taking a
long overdue step toward formal recognition of the great cost that was
borne by the Native Americans in the name of progress.
To suggest exactly what kind of language should be used for such an
amendment is premature. The process must include Native peoples
from a variety of backgrounds, historians to assist the majority in
understanding what was already promised and never delivered, and
politicians because this is inherently a political process. The proposed
language should create a clear place for Native Americans in the
GETCHES, supra note 25, at 204.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land . . . .”).
168
Id. at amend. X. (emphasis added).
169
Alfred L. Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand upon the Constitution: Federal-State
Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 198 n.37 (1990).
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Constitution, and thus in this country. Some have argued that this
already exists. Professor Resnik has argued that “[t]he U.S. Constitution
appears to recognize tribes as having a status outside its parameters, as
entities free from the taxing powers of states and of the federal
government and with whom the federal government shares commercial
relations and makes treaties.”170 Some Native American legal scholars
have argued that “the net result is constitutional recognition of a third
domestic sovereign, while others describe the relationship as existing
outside the Constitution.”171 Regardless, constitutional recognition of a
“third domestic sovereign” by the founders has been ignored to the
point that a constitutional amendment is necessary to reinforce and
guarantee any rights that may or may not exist at this time.172
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed the following changes to improve the
ability of Native Americans to control their own destiny: a change in
governmental and judicial policy from Self-Determination to SelfDominance; the use of judicial doctrine, including international law
interpretations, to promote an increased recognition of tribal rights; a
return to the early constitutional-based view of a presumption of tribal
sovereignty; and the passage of a constitutional amendment to guarantee
tribal rights and influence judicial interpretation of already existing
rights. These recommendations, all in some way linked to constitutional
interpretation or change, will not make every Indian well-educated,
well-fed, and independent. They would not necessarily make any visible
changes for generations, but that is to be expected. Significant cultural
change takes time.
Before the white man landed on the shores of the so-called New
World, Native Americans lived vibrant, if at times difficult, lives for
centuries. Unquestionably, the indigenous peoples were self-sufficient
and independent. While it seemed to happen quickly, the near170
Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Government,
79 JUDICATURE 118, 118 (1995).
171
Id.
172
Of course, any amendment that is drafted should be crafted in a manner that will
ensure that any Native American rights that already exist remain intact. In no way should
any proposed change reduce the limited rights Native Americans may have already
secured. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission’s
recognition that some rights may be guaranteed already to the indigenous people of
Canada through section 35 of Canada’s constitution and that any such rights should not be
altered by constitutional amendment).
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destruction of Native American culture took hundreds of years from the
day Columbus first arrived. It will take generations to rebuild any
semblance of the autonomy that Native Americans once had.
Native Americans are resilient. They have survived, with at least
part of their culture intact, through attempts to terminate their existence
entirely. It is time for the United States to open a dialogue and make
some changes. Most U.S. citizens recognize that Native Americans hold
a unique place in the United States and the world; they recognize that
Native Americans have suffered greatly in the development of the
country. The time has come for the people of the United States to
recognize formally and explicitly the rightful place of this nation’s first
inhabitants within the Constitution and to allow Native Americans the
means to a continued and fruitful existence.
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